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EDUCATION, SEGREGATION AND THE SUPREME COURT
-A POLITICAL ANALYSIS.
By JOHN P. RoCHEt
Eleven months ago in the celebrated Sweatt and McLaurin cases 1
the United States Supreme Court made headlines by requiring two
southern state universities to grant full equality of educational treat-
ment to two Negro students. Since that time a discussion has raged on
the implications of these two decisions with some commentators main-
taining that the Court in effect undermined the precedent of Plessy v.
Ferguson,2 and others of a more cautious bent holding that the Court
did no more than reemphasize the principles enounced ten years ago
in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada.3  Since there has now been time
for the Court's decisions last June to percolate down to the lower federal
and state courts, it seems timely to reassess the Sweatt and McLaurin
cases in the light of their effects on subsequent equal protection deci-
sions.
Before beginning this investigation, however, it may be advisable
to examine closely the Court's holdings in those two cases to see what,
if any, alternate, or possibly even contradictory, interpretations of the
meaning of "equal protection" might be based upon them. Two im-
portant points deserve extended consideration.
First, in spite of the urgings of counsel for Sweatt and McLaurin
and many groups in amici curiae capacities,4 the Court refused to re-
examine the doctrine laid down in Plessy v. Ferguson 5 that equal,
separate facilities for Negroes and whites do not violate the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the Court refused
even to discuss this issue. In reply to the contention that separate
facilities were per se unequal Chief Justice Vinson merely stated:
t A. B., Hofstra; A. M., Ph. D., Cornell University. Assistant Professor of
Political Science, Haverford College. Author, The Loss of Americani Nationality-
The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 25 (1950).
1. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) has
been omitted from consideration since it was decided on the basis of statutory in-
terpretation.
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
4. Among the groups that filed supporting briefs were the United States, the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Federation of Teachers, the
American Veterans Committee, and the Committee of Law Teachers Against Segrega-
tion. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People carried
these cases to the Supreme Court.
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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[These cases] present different aspects of this general ques-
tion: To what extent does the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment limit the power of a state to distinguish
between students of different races in professional and graduate
education in a state university? Broader issues have been urged
for our consideration, but we adhere to the principle of deciding
constitutional questions only in the context of the particular case
before the Court.6
Looking at Plessy v. Ferguson ' in the light of this declaration, one
might be justified in asking how the "separate but equal" doctrine ever
obtained validity in the field of education in the first place. Plessy
dealt with the validity of separate railroad accommodations, not segre-
gated educational facilities. As one of the briefs presented to the Court
in the Sweatt case put it:
in Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), the Court treated
segregation in education as legitimate on the basis of the Plessy
and Cumming cases despite the fact that the basic problem was not
argued in the Gong Lum case and that it was neither involved in
Plessy nor decided in Cumming. The result is that if segregation
in education is constitutional, it became so under a rule of law
that came from no place.'
In short, the "separate but equal" rule enunciated in Plessy v.
Ferguson was almost automatically broadened to regulate every
possible relationship between Negroes and whites, but the present Court
will supply no similarly automatic counter-agent. Every area of segre-
gation must be litigated on its merits before the shade of Plessy will
be exorcised from American life and constitutional law. Presumably
the Court looks forward to years of peeling layers off the onion and at
last arriving at the place where nothing remains. This may be a
process which will cause the least dislocation and furore in the South,
but it is litigious, expensive and, above all, time consuming. At a
time when a speedy demonstration of the meaning of American demo-
cratic ideals is an essential factor in the struggle with the pseudo-egali-
tarian Communists, any countenancing of segregation by the Supreme
Court arms our enemies.
Why did the Court so curtly reject the sword offered to it? Spec-
ulation on the motives of the justices is an unrewarding pastime and
normally should be left to the retrospective omniscience of biographers,
but there is one feature of the Sweatt and McLaurin cases that en-
6. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950).
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
8. Brief of the Committee of Law Teachers against Segregation, as Amicus
Curi4e p. 35, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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courages contemporary analysis-both decisions were unanimous! At
a time when the unanimous decision is rapidly becoming a rare bird in
the forest of American constitutional law,9 even the most cautious com-
mentator may be led to suspect something out of the ordinary when two
unanimous decisions occur on one day in the vital area of racial segre-
gation.
It is possible that a majority could have been mustered to overrule
Plessy v. Ferguson, but that this majority might have felt that a five-
four decision on the issue would be politically disasterous. It is even
more probable that the advocates of this strong action could not muster
a majority and settled for a unanimous decision on the lowest common
denominator. This would explain in part the Chief Justice's evasion
of the basic question of "separate but equal." In any case, the una-
nimity of the Court in these opinions was a political tour de force, given
added effectiveness by the fact that Chief Justice Vinson, a leading
southern figure in Washington,"° spoke for the Court.
Second, the Court pointed out that there were certain situations in
which separation per se denied that equality of treatment which is re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the McLaurin case the issue
was: Once admitted to a combined state university, could a Negro be
segregated? In the Gaines case," the Court had held that a state wish-
ing to segregate college students must build them a separate institution
equal in all respects to its counterpart. If the state were unwilling to
do this, it must admit them to its regular educational facilities. Un-
willing to build a separate Graduate School of Education for its Negro
constituents, the state of Oklahoma had admitted McLaurin to its white
Graduate School of Education, but took great pains to prevent the
Negro student from "contaminating" his white neighbors. He was
given a separate desk in the mezzanine of the library and not permitted
to use the desks on the floor of the reading room, he was required to
sit in the anteroom adjoining the classroom, he was given his meals at
a different time from white students.'
Chief Justice Vinson held that McLaurin had indeed been denied
the equal protection of the laws. Once he had been admitted to a state
9. See Pritchett. The Roosevelt Court: Votes and Values, 42 Am. PoL. ScI.
R-v. 53 (1948), for an excellent treatment of the growing number of dissenting
opinions and the reasons for this growth. Pritchett shows that the percentage of
non-unanimous opinions rose from 16 in 1935 to 64 in 1946, the last year analyzed.
The analysis of Note, The Suprevw Court, 1949 Term, 64 HARv. L. REv. 114 (1950)
reveals that only 38% of the decisions in which full opinions were read were unani-
mous. Id. at 162. Needless to say, the more controversial the issue, the more dis-
sents.
10. Several times in the past two years southern Congressmen have suggested
unofficially that Vinson replace Acheson as Secretary of State.
11. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
12. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 640 (1950).
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supported graduate school in which whites and Negroes were combined,
McLaurin "must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state
as students of other races." "3 Thus the state of Oklahoma, having re-
fused to supply McLaurin with separate equal facilities, must grant
him full equality in its single, combined school. In effect, the McLaurin
case was an implementation and amplification of the Gaines case. 4 It
has added importance from the fact that the Court here pointed to a
situation in which separation was per se unconstitutional.
The Sweatt 15 case was far more complicated and contained over-
tones that were missing from McLaurin. Following the rule es-
tablished in the Gaines case, Texas opened a separate law school for
Negroes in preference to admitting them to its white school. However,
Sweatt claimed that this Negro school was unequal in facilities to its
white counterpart. The Court agreed that the Negro facilities were
separate and unequal, but based its opinion on grounds that could go
far to undermine the "separate but equal" rule. After pointing out
that the white law school was technically superior to the Negro one
in its staff, buildings, and library, Chief Justice Vinson continued,
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School
[white] possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness
in a law school. . . . The law school, the proving ground for
legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from
the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.' 6
The Chief Justice then noted that the Negro law school automati-
cally excluded 85% of the population of Texas-the people who would
sit on the juries, be the witnesses, officials and judges in the courts
where Negro lawyers would practice. From this he drew the conclusion
that,
With such a substantial and significant segment of society
excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner
is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted
to the University of Texas Law School.
.7
The implications of this last statement are tremendous. The
Chief Justice stated in so many words that separate legal education
cannot be equal: the very existence of segregation in legal training
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Immediately the question arises:
13. Id. at 642.
14. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
15. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
16. Id. at 634.
17. Ibid.
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In what other areas of education might this rule be applied? What one
is here asking is in what other fields are students being trained for
community action, and answers immediately spring to mind. Cer-
tainly the medical and teaching professions are analogous to the legal,
and it is difficult to think of an area to which this "community action"
principle is not in some degree applicable.
Specific application to other fields of learning must await the
labyrinthine process of litigation. Furthermore, Justice Frankfurter
to the contrary notwithstanding,18 the Court's attitude must be charted
as much from the cases it refuses to review as from those on which
it expresses an explicit opinion. Since the Court refuses to generalize,
or even to peek beyond the confines of the immediate case at bar, its
specific actions in denying certiorari assume additional meaning. 9
This summary and interpretation of the Sweatt and McLaurin
cases should serve to demonstrate that the Court left several avenues of
precedent open for lower courts to follow. In analysing a segregated
situation a judge may:
1. Cite the Sweatt and McLaurin cases as precedents for ruling
that "separate but equal" facilities do not violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-"Plessy was not overruled."
2. Cite the McLaurin case as precedent for ruling that where a
state has combined Negroes and whites in the same facilities it may not
enforce segregation.
3. Cite the Sweatt case as precedent for ruling that where unequal
separate facilities have been established the Fourteenth Amendment has
been violated.
4. Cite the Sweatt and McLaurin cases as precedents for ruling
that in certain situations the very fact of segregation engenders in-
equality, violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although the Court's decisions in these two cases aroused
national and international 0 attention, there have been relatively few
relevant cases in the federal and state courts decided in the last eleven
months. However, an analysis of these subsequent decisions may prove
useful in determining what the effect of the above decisions on the
segregation system will be.
18. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
19. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Harper & Rosenthal, Whuat The
Supreme Court Did Not Do It the 1949 Term--An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99.
U. OF PA. L. Rav. 293 (1950).
20. For an acute foreign analysis see Hinden, Hope in the Negro South, 14
SocIALIsT COMMENTARY 210 (Sept. 1950).
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To date the Supreme Court has taken action in two cases on the
basis of the Sweatt and McLaurin holdings. The first, Rice v.
Arnold,"' may be very significant, for in it the Court suggested a
possible new application of the "combined facilities" rule laid down in
the McLaurin case to a municipal golfcourse. The city of Miami,
Florida, owns a municipal golfcourse on which Negroes were allowed
to play one day per week. This division of time between whites and
Negroes was based on the statistical ground that six times as many
whites as Negroes used the course. The Florida Supreme Court held
that this was a legitimate division of time as the Negroes were granted
substantial equality.22 The Supreme Court, in a one paragraph Per
Curiam decision, reversed this holding and remanded the case to the
Florida court for "reconsideration in the light of subsequent decisions
of this Court in Sweatt v. Painter, and McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, .... " 23
What did the Court mean by this cryptic statement? While it is
impossible to know exactly, it would appear that the city of Miami has
the option of building a separate, equal golfcourse for Negroes, or ad-
mitting Negroes without discrimination of any kind to the combined
golfcourse. If this is the correct interpretation of the Court's intent,
the implications for southern municipalities are enormous. Unless
these towns are prepared to build or otherwise establish fully equal
separate recreational facilities for Negroes, they must admit them to
combined facilities on a basis of complete equality. An arrangement
whereby Negroes use a municipal swimming pool one day per week
would obviously fall under this rule, but what about segregation in
municipally owned transportation systems? If the "combined facili-
ties" rule were applied to segregation in street cars, buses, etc., where
Negroes are relegated to the rear seats of the vehicles, it would seem
that municipalities would either have to supply separate, equal buses
for Negroes, or abandon the discriminatory seating arrangements.
State laws or municipal ordinances requiring segregation on vehicles
used by the whites and Negroes in common logically should fall under
this interdict. If carried to this point, the doctrine of "combined
facilities" would go far in the direction of subverting the Plessy rule.
The second case decided by the Supreme Court, Board of Super-
visors of Louisiana State University v. Wilson, 4 served to reempha-
size the rule of the Sweatt case that separate facilities must be equal.
The district court, in ruling that Wilson must be admitted to the white
21. 340 U.S. 848 (1950).
22. Rice v. Arnold. 45 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1950).
23. 340 U.S. 848 (1950).
24. 340 U.S. 909 (1950).
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law school at Louisiana State University, did not discuss the question
of whether segregated legal education could be legitimate; it merely held
that equal facilities had not been supplied for Negroes.25 The Supreme
Court, again Per Curiam, affirmed the decision of the lower court
without discussion.2 Thus, unfortunately, in neither opinion was the
implication of the Sweatt case that segregation in publicly supported
colleges training students for "community action" was unconstitutional
elaborated.
Since the Sweatt and McLaurin cases, only three segregation
problems have been litigated in the United States Courts of Appeal.
Last July the Fourth Circuit held in Boyer v. Garrett2 that the city
of Baltimore had supplied separate, equal recreational facilities for
Negroes and whites, and, consequently, that segregation was valid on
the basis of Plessy v. Ferguson. In December 1949 the district court
upheld the segregation on the ground that Plessy v. Ferguson was
still good law,28 and the Circuit apparently felt that Sweatt and
McLaurin had confirmed Plessy, adding "It is for the Supreme Court,
not us, to overrule its decisions or to hold them outmoded." 29
In the second case, Brown v. Ransey 30 the Eighth Circuit sus-
tained the separate educational facilities of Fort Smith, Arkansas, as
substantially equal. The decision in this case, as in Boyer v. Garrett,
31
rested squarely on the Plessy rule. Unless the Circuits had been willing
to reject Plessy outright, it is difficult to see how they could have
decided either case differently.
On March 27, 1951, the Fourth Circuit held that the University
of North Carolina must admit Negro law students to its white law
school. The court based its decision on the patent inequality of the
legal training offered to Negroes at the colored law school."2
In addition to the Wilson case,33 discussed above at the appeal
level, there has been only one relevant recorded decision in the United
25. Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 92 F. Supp.
986 (E.D. La. 1950).
26. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U. v. Wilson, 340 U.S. 909 (1950).
27. 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950).
28. Boyer v. Garrett, 88 F. Supp. 353 (Md. 1949).
29. Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950).
30. 185 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1950).
31. Boyer v. Garrett, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950).
32. Information on the content of the court's opinion obtained through the courtesy
of Mr. Robert Carter, Assistant Special Counsel, N.A.A.C.P. This was a reversal
of District Judge Hayes' decision last November that the facilities offered to Negroes
at North Carolina College were "substantially equal" to those at Chapel Hill. See
Civil Liberties, Monthly Bulletin of the American Civil Liberties Union, November
1950, p. 4.
33. See notes 24 and 25 supra.
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States District Courts since last June. 4  In Draper v. St. Louis 8  a
district court ruled that Negroes must be given immediate access to
outdoor swimming pools supported by municipal funds. Although
Judge Hulen did not explicitly so state, it would appear from this deci-
sion that St. Louis must admit Negroes to all outdoor swimming pools
until it can build fully equal, separate pools for them. The city ap-
parently cannot escape from its obligation by merely building one out-
door pool for Negroes."0
So far there has been little recorded activity in the state courts
occasioned by the Sweatt and McLaurin decisions. A thorough review
of all reports shows eight cases on the points at issue. For convenience
sake, they will be discussed in chronological order.
The first case, State v. Board of Education,7 was decided
before the Supreme Court's decisions in the Sweatt and McLaurin
cases, but since a petition for rehearing was denied a week after
the High Court's action, it has been included in this analysis. The
issue at bar was whether there was "substantial equality" between the
Negro and the white state teachers' colleges in St. Louis. The Supreme
Court of Missouri held, reversing a lower court decision, that there was
substantial if not mathematical equality between these two institutions.
It would seem that this would be a case in which the "community
action" rule, discussed above, might be applicable. If teachers are being
trained to work in mixed communities, it could follow from the tenor
of Chief Justice Vinson's remarks in the Sweatt case 38 that segregation
in teacher training is automatically unconstitutional. However, the
Supreme Court of Missouri refused to revise its decision, and there is
no recorded appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
The next five cases, decided on the same day by the Florida
Supreme Court, all concerned the right of Negro students to attend
the white facilities of the University of Florida. Two asked admission
34. Apparently there have been decisions on this point that have gone unrecorded.For example, an article in a weekly magazine recently discussed the admission ofone Gregory Swanson to the Law School of the University of Virginia. The boardof visitors of the University at first refused the Negro's request for admission."A court test followed. It took a three-judge Federal court about thirty minutesto hear and to decide the case.- An injunction was issued to compel the Universityto admit Mr. Swanson and 'others similarly situated' to its law school." King,Breaking Down the Barriers, The New Leader, September 30, 1950, p. 11. This de-cision apparently was not solemnized in the Federal Reporter, and there may be
others in the same category.
35. 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950).
36. "The completion by defendants at some future date, and restriction to use
of members of plaintiff's race, of an open-air swimming pool in some other part ofthe City, is no answer to plaintiffs' present claim of their constitutional rights.Even when completed such a pool may mitigate discrimination, but it will not vali-
date it as to other sections of the City." Id. at 550.
37. 230 S.W.2d 724 (Mo. 1950).
38. See note 1 sitpra.
EDUCATION, SEGREGATION, AN ANALYSIS
to the School of Law,39 one to the College of Chemical Engineering,"
one to the College of Pharmacy,41 and one to the Graduate School of
Agriculture.42 Subsequent to the filing of these suits, the state of
Florida took action to establish separate educational facilities for these
Negro students. The Florida court held that the establishment of
these schools on the substantially equal basis contemplated would satisfy
the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment, and approved the interim
arrangement whereby the Negroes could attend the white facilities until
equal separate schools have been set up.43 The court refused to examine
the question of whether these proposed facilities would in fact be sub-
stantially equal on the ground that the Negro students could not raise
this issue until they were admitted.
44
It is interesting to note the interpretation this court put upon the
Supreme Court's holding in the Sweatt case. It entirely ignored the
implication that separate legal training could not be equal, stating:
No court in the land has ever required of a sovereign state
any more than is encompassed within the plan proposed by the
Board of Control in its answer. [The establishment of separate
equal law schools.] Every individual political right and privilege
guaranteed the citizen by the provisions of the Federal Constitu-
tion is maintained under the program, while at the same time the
right of the State to adopt such method as it finds best designed
to afford substantially equal educational opportunities to Florida
citizens of different race groups has been preserved. See
Sweatt v. Painter . . .45
This demonstrates the degree to which the Supreme Court's de-
cision can be interpreted as merely a refinement of the Plessy v. Fer-
guson doctrine. It serves as an interesting example of how men's ideo-
logical commitments can operate to the direct disadvantage of their
pocketbooks-the establishment of separate Negro facilities to parallel
all those existing for whites is an expensive process.
The Negroes won their first substantial victory in Delaware. In
August 1950 the Delaware Court of Chancery, after an elaborate in-
vestigation and comparison of the facilities offered by the state to its
39. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1950), State
ex rel. Lewis v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1950).
40. State ex rel. Maxey v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1950).
41. State ex rel. Boyd v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1950).
42. State ex rel. Finley v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1950).
43. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1950). The
Florida court discussed the problems raised in the Hawkinrs case. The other cases
were decided by reference to the opinion in Hawkins.
44. Id. at 616.
45. Id. at 614.
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white and Negro citizens, determined that the State College for Negroes
was substantially unequal to the University of Delaware.46 However,
Vice Chancellor Seitz emphasized that segregation alone was in no
sense violative of the equal protection clause, and added:
As recently as June of this year the United States Supreme
Court applied the separate but equal test in two cases involving
graduate and professional schools.
47
The most recent recorded case " deals with a different aspect of
education than those discussed heretofore. Wesley Brewton, a Negro
high school student, brought suit against the St. Louis Board of Edu-
cation to gain admission to a course in aeromechanics offered in a
white high school only.4" The Supreme Court of Missouri, while
noting that exact parallelism of courses was not required by the Four-
teenth Amendment, held that the exclusion of Negroes from this course
constituted a substantial inequality of educational facilities. The Board
of Education could not escape the alternatives of either admitting
Brewton to this course in the white school, or offering it in the Negro
school.50
This concludes the summation of segregation cases decided since
the Supreme Court's action last June in the Sweatt and McLaurin
cases. If any moral can be drawn, it would appear to be that the High
Court will have to make its position clear. If, as is assumed herein,
the Court initiated a departure from the Plessy rule that segregation is
constitutional so long as equal separate facilities are supplied both
"races", this point must be explicitly driven home in the months that
come. The Court should have ample opportunity, to state clearly its
views on segregation in legal education, as well as in other fields of
specialized study. If it applies what I have described as the "coin-
46. Parker v. University of Delaware, 75 A.2d 225 (Del. 1950).
47. Id. at 230.
48. Since this article was completed, Mr. Robert Carter, Assistant Special
Counsel of the N.A.A.C.P., has sent me information on several unrecorded segrega-
tion cases. Two cases were decided by the Maryland courts, one holding that a
Negro girl must be admitted to the School of Nursing at the University of Maryland,
and the other requiring the University of Maryland to admit a Negro to the
Graduate School of Sociology. Both of these decisions were based on the lack of
equal-or any-educational facilities for Negroes in these fields. The Board of
Regents of the University of Maryland subsequently announced that in any case
where instruction was offered to whites at the University and was not offered to
Negroes at a separate institution, Negroes would be admitted to the University. At
the present moment the N.A.A.C.P. is taking action against the University of
Kentucky, and has to date been successful in its suits there. I should like to express
my gratitude to Mr. Carter for his courtesy in supplying me with information about
these unrecorded decisions.
49. State ex rel. Brewton v. Board of Education, 233 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1950).
50. For a similar determination made prior to the Sweatt and McLaurin cases,
see Carter v. School Board, 182 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1950).
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munity action" principle, that segregation per se is unconstitutional
where the state is training young citizens for community action, a new
milestone in equal protection will have been achieved. Plessy v. Fer-
guson, though not overruled explicitly, may be undermined in the
specific area of education.
Even if the Supreme Court should beat a "strategic retreat" to the
position that equal separate educational facilities fulfill the requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment provided they are in fact fully equal, the
Sweatt and McLaurin cases will still have considerable significance for
the future. As more and more Negro students demand their educa-
tional rights from the states, the latter will be faced with the prospect of
building fully equal parallel facilities in many areas of study. This
uneconomic process may continue for some time, but in the long run
"the high cost of prejudice" may do more to eliminate segregation than
would be accomplished by idealism working alone. The states are now
faced with the alternatives of building separate, equal and expensive
establishments for Negroes, or of admitting the Negro students on a
fully equal basis to combined facilities. Thus, even if the Court rejects
the "community action" principle, the operation of the "combined facili-
ties" rule marks a great advance in interpretation and application of the
equal protection clause.
Plessy v. Ferguson still stands, but not with its former vigor and
certainty. Like an ancient fort, it shakes upon its foundations and the
wind whistles through gaps in its walls. Some may claim that it is
still defendable, but others, with a better understanding of the impera-
tives of modern democracy, realize that its walls are but hollow shells.
Perhaps it will survive another decade; perhaps it will never be taken
by storm, but the inexorable demands of a democratic society will
eventually leave it, at best, a historical curiosity, at worst, an anony-
mous pile of rubble.
